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A Law Guardian by Any Other Name: A
Critique of the Report of the
Matrimonial Commission
Martin Guggenheim*
Introduction
In 1979, then-Chief Judge Breital wrote a short opinion for
New York's Court of Appeals in a contested custody dispute that
has left an unintended (and almost unrecognizable) legacy. In
Braiman v. Braiman,1 the court struggled to render a final
judgment in an extremely heated case in which the trial court
ruled for the father, the appellate court reversed and awarded
joint custody to both parents, and the Court of Appeals found
itself in the uncomfortable position of not knowing what to do
because the record was "plagued ... with hopelessly conflicting
testimony on vital facts and issues."2 Accordingly, it remanded
the case to the trial court with instructions to conduct a new
hearing. In addition, and as an aside, Chief Judge Breital of-
fered a suggestion to the trial court: it could, he wrote, if it
chose to, appoint "a qualified guardian ad litem for the children,
who would be charged with the responsibility of close investiga-
tion and exploration of the truth on the issues and perhaps even
of recommending by way of report alternative resolutions for
the court to consider."3 Thus, a wrinkle was let loose in the
practice of contested custody and visitation cases that is quickly
transforming the field.
Although the New York legislature originally recognized
the value of providing children with lawyers (with the chosen
* Fiorello LaGuardia Professor of Clinical Law, New York University School
of Law. I am grateful for financial support from the Filomen D'Agostino and Max
E. Greenberg Research Fund at New York University School of Law. I also wish to
thank and acknowledge the outstanding research assistance provided by Randi
Levine, a member of the NYU School of Law Class of 2008.
1. 378 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 1978).
2. Id. at 1019.
3. Id. at 1022. The two children were seven-and-a-half and six years old. Id.
at 1019.
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title of "law guardians") in 1962, it focused on proceedings in
which children were formal parties, and usually charged with
misconduct which they were obliged to defend. 4 By 1970, New
York courts were routinely appointing lawyers for children in
juvenile delinquency and Persons In Need of Supervision pro-
ceedings, as well as in child protective proceedings in which lo-
cal agencies charged parents with abuse or neglect and
subjected children to foster care placement and termination of
parental rights.5
That is largely where things stood through the mid-1980s.
Back then, the idea of appointing a child with an attorney in a
contested custody or visitation case was avant-garde in New
York and almost never done. One might promptly add, there
are excellent reasons for distinguishing between the kinds of
cases in which New York courts saw fit to appoint lawyers for
children through this period and custody cases in which New
York courts eschewed the use of counsel for children, but we are
getting ahead of ourselves. Suffice it to say, through this time,
contested custody cases in New York were almost always liti-
gated without the appointment of an attorney for the child.
Fast forward to the early 2000s and the picture has dra-
matically changed.6 Although New York continues to maintain
the distinction between the first set of cases in which children
have the statutory right to court-appointed counsel and custody
cases where appointment is left to the discretion of the trial
court,7 there is an ever growing call to appoint lawyers for chil-
dren in all contested custody cases.8 Despite this trend, New
4. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT, 1962 N.Y. Laws, ch. 686 (current version at N.Y.
FA. CT. ACT § 241 (McKinney 2006)); see also Jane M. Spinak, The Role of Strate-
gic Management Planning in Improving the Representation of Clients: A Child Ad-
vocacy Example, 34 FAM. L.Q. 497, 498 (2000).
5. See Douglas J. Besharov, Practice Commentary, N.Y. FAM CT. ACT §§ 241,
249 (McKinney 1998).
6. See Merril Sobie, Supplemental Practice Commentary, N.Y. FAM CT. ACT
§ 249 (McKinney 2003).
7. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 249 (McKinney 2006).
8. See, e.g., Howard A. Davidson, The Child's Right to be Heard and Repre-
sented in Judicial Proceedings, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 255, 255-56, 276-77 (1991); Linda
D. Elrod, Raising the Bar for Lawyers Who Represent Children: ABA Standards of
Practice for Custody Cases, 37 FAM. L.Q. 105, 108-09 (2003); Linda D. Elrod, Coun-
sel for the Child in Custody Disputes: The Time is Now, 26 FAM. L.Q. 53, 53 (1992);
Ann M. Haralambie & Deborah L. Glaser, Practical and Theoretical Problems with
the AAML Standards for Representing "Impaired" Children, 13 J. AMv. AcAD. MA-
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York has not adequately addressed basic questions about why
courts should provide children with lawyers in custody cases
and the proper role these lawyers should undertake. Although
two national efforts have sought to clarify these antecedent
questions, 9 New York has lagged and has never undertaken a
sustained, serious look at them.
In 2006, the most important Commission ever assembled to
study the matrimonial process in New York issued an extensive
report examining both the substance and process of New York's
divorce system and proposing widespread change. 10 The Report
of the Matrimonial Commission to the Chief Judge of the State
of New York (hereinafter "the Commission" or "the Commis-
sion's Report") resulted from multiple meetings over more than
one year of a diverse and highly experienced group of experts
which convened public hearings providing a very broad opportu-
nity for obtaining information." The subjects the Commission
studied included the use of lawyers for children. 12 Regrettably,
the Commission's Report does not include a sustained consider-
ation of the most basic questions about using lawyers for chil-
dren in custody cases. Instead of independent analysis and
vigorous discussion of the most pressing questions concerning
the use of lawyers for children, the Commission only gives con-
clusions. One of its important conclusions is in the form of a
preference: that most of the time courts appoint lawyers for
children in contested custody cases. 13 I will only address the
TRIM. LAW. 57, 92-93 (1995); Robyn-Marie Lyon, Comment, Speaking for a Child:
The Role of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 CAL. L. REV. 681, 687-88 (1987);
Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing Counsel for Children in
Civil Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1571, 1578-86 (1996).
9. American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Representing Children: Stan-
dards for Attorneys and Guardians ad Litem in Custody or Visitation Proceedings,
13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 1 (1995) [hereinafter AAML Standards]; AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF FAMILY LAW STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS
REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CUSTODY CASES (2003), http://www.abanet.org/family/
reports/standardschildcustody.pdf [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
10. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT TO THE
CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Feb. 2006), http://www.nycourts.gov/
reports/matrimonialcommissionreport.pdf.; reprinted here as Appendix A. [herein-
after MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT].
11. See id. at i-ii.
12. See id. at 39-45.
13. See id. at 41. The Commission's prose occasionally makes it unclear
whose voice is speaking. The Commission's Report states:
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Commission's Report on the single issue of lawyers for children,
and I express no view on the many other subjects in the Com-
mission's Report. Part I sets forth the Commission's recommen-
dations concerning lawyers for children. Part II reveals the
multitude of questions and issues that the Commission ignored.
It also suggests that the Commission's Report deliberately em-
phasizes the ordinariness of the role and purpose of children's
lawyers, thereby obfuscating the complexities raised by using
lawyers in these proceedings. Part III discusses the bases upon
which New York courts are to decide custody cases in order to
show that they expect children's best interests, not children's
preferences, to dominate the court's inquiry. Part IV describes
what judges want and expect from children's lawyers in custody
proceedings, demonstrating that courts routinely expect these
lawyers to advise them on children's best interests. Following
this, Part V suggests that the Commission did not intend to
change either how courts are supposed to decide cases or what
children's lawyers are supposed to do when appointed to re-
present children. This part reveals the true extent to which the
Commission liberates children's lawyers to advocate what they
perceive to be in their clients' best interests as well as the dan-
gers associated with encouraging lawyers to perform this role.
I. The Commission's Recommendations
Perhaps the most startling quality of the Commission's
work is its brevity. Altogether, it devoted only six pages to the
The appointment of an attorney for the child, and his or her active participa-
tion in the proceedings, ensures independent representation for the chil-
dren. Pursuant to Family Court Act § 249, the appointment of an attorney
for the child in a custody dispute is within the sound discretion of the court.
Nonetheless, there is a preference for the appointment of an attorney for the
child in such disputes. Indeed, the failure to make such an appointment in
certain custody proceedings has been deemed to be an improvident exercise
of a court's discretion.
Id. (citing Vecchiarelli v. Vecchiarelli, 656 N.Y.S.2d 337, 338-39 (App. Div. 1997);
McWhirter v. McWhirter, 514 N.Y.S.2d 301 (App. Div. 1987)). Does the Commis-
sion mean that current law states a preference for children's lawyers or that the
Commission prefers them? Current law is certainly unclear. The fact that courts
have held the failure to appoint a law guardian to be reversible error in some cases
is no proof that courts are expected to appoint them most of the time. It remains
the case today that most custody matters are contested without children's lawyers.
Whether that will remain so in the future remains to be seen.
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subject of representing children. 14 The means by which it was
able to say so little is that it incorporated by reference other
efforts produced in New York. The Commission chose the expe-
dient (if problematic) device of endorsing and recommending
"the adoption by administrative rule of the Statewide Law
Guardian Advisory Committee's working definition of the role
of the attorney for the child."1 5 It also recommended the adop-
tion of the recently revised New York State Bar Association's
Law Guardian Representation Standards by administrative
rule. 16 Here is the Statewide Advisory Committee's definition
in its entirety:
The law guardian is the attorney for the child. In juvenile delin-
quency proceedings, it is the responsibility of the law guardian to
vigorously represent the child. In other types of proceedings, it is
the responsibility of the law guardian to diligently advocate the
child's position in the litigation. In ascertaining that position, the
law guardian must consult with and advise the child to the extent
possible and in a manner consistent with the child's capacities. If
the child is capable of a knowing, voluntary and considered judg-
ment, the law guardian should be directed by the wishes of the
child, even if the law guardian believes that what the child wants
is not in the child's best interest. However, when the law guard-
ian is convinced either that the child lacks the capacity for mak-
ing a knowing, voluntary, and considered judgment or that
following the child's wishes is likely to result in a risk of physical
or emotional harm to the child, the law guardian would be justi-
fied in taking a position that is contrary to the child's wishes. In
these circumstances, the law guardian should report the child's
articulated wishes to the court if the child wants the law guardian
to do so, notwithstanding the law guardian's position. 17
Unfortunately, this definition is plainly inadequate. First,
note the odd use of adjectives as the starting point for clarifying
a lawyer's role. We are told that in delinquency proceedings the
child's lawyer is to "vigorously represent the child." But, surely
this is premature. We need to take some stock of what the role
14. See MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 39-45.
15. Id. at 39.
16. Id. at 42-43.
17. Id. at 39-40 (quoting Appellate Division, Second, Third and Fourth De-
partments, Law Guardian Program Administrative Handbook (2004), http:/!
nycourts.gov/ad4/lgflg_2004handbook.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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is before focusing on the degree of vigor with which we should
perform it. Astonishingly the drafters of this statement have
nothing more to say about lawyers in delinquency proceedings.
Instead, they immediately turn to the role of lawyers for chil-
dren in all other types of cases.' 8 Here we are treated to our
first difference in roles. Whereas attorneys for children in de-
linquency proceedings are obliged to "vigorously represent"
their clients, in other types of proceedings, they are to "dili-
gently advocate the child's position in the litigation."19 Perhaps
some readily grasp these distinctions, but they will prove to be
inscrutable to many. Let us try to make some sense of them.
The important distinction between the two roles plainly is
not the difference between "vigorously" and "diligently." It
must be the difference between "representing the child" and
"advocating the child's position." On its face, this would seem to
mean that when lawyers are representing children in all pro-
ceedings not involving delinquency, they are straightforwardly
to seek the position chosen by the child. In contrast, in delin-
quency proceedings, it would seem the children's lawyers are
supposed to do something else ("represent the child"). But ap-
pearances can be misleading.
The drafters of this definition say nothing at all about how
a lawyer representing a delinquent is to determine what posi-
tion to advocate. From this, we may reasonably infer there are
no tasks unique to representing children which their lawyers
need to take. In other words, all children's lawyers in delin-
quency cases need to do is ask their clients what they want. In
this way, to "represent the child" means to advocate for the
objectives set by the child. When discussing lawyers in all other
18. The Matrimonial Commission Report definition inexplicably separates ju-
venile delinquency and Persons in Need of Supervision (PINS) cases. This distinc-
tion has no support in the literature or case law. To the contrary, when New York
first enacted the counsel-appointing statute, it categorized delinquents and PINS
together in the same Article 7 of the New York Family Court Act and provided
children with the same kind of counsel in each proceeding. Today, the Family
Court Act discusses delinquents separately in Article 3 while PINS remain in Arti-
cle 7. No one else in New York distinguishes between delinquents and PINS. The
"other proceedings," in all events, include neglect and abuse and foster care related
proceedings including termination of parental rights (Articles 6 and 10), as well as
child custody and visitation cases (Article 6). See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT (McKinney
2006).
19. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 39.'
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proceedings, the definition explains how lawyers are supposed
to ascertain the position to "diligently advocate." These addi-
tional steps ultimately authorize children's lawyers to advocate
for a position "contrary to the child's wishes." Thus, in this pe-
culiar Alice-in-Wonderland scenario, "advocating for the child's
position" does not mean advocating for what the child wants; it
means, instead, advocating for a result chosen by the lawyer. 20
Thus, the directive to "diligently advocate their clients' position"
is at best inadequate and at worst deceptive. Yet, the Commis-
sion simply adopts the law guardian definition without address-
ing these matters.
A second reason for the shortness of the Commission's law
guardian recommendations is, as we shall see in the next sec-
tion, that the Commission ignored most of the important ques-
tions which need to be addressed when considering the use of
children's lawyers in custody cases. The law guardian section
begins promisingly enough by mentioning a number of ques-
tions the Commission considered. In particular, it observed
that:
Questions have been raised about the proper role of attorneys for
the child in custody proceedings, when they should be appointed,
their qualifications, and protocols for representation. Other is-
sues of concern are how attorneys for the child should be compen-
sated, and mechanisms for monitoring their performance. 21
Instead of clarifying what these questions and issues of concern
were, the Commission only assured us that it gave them "exten-
sive review and much deliberation"22 and advised that "this is-
sue requires further research, discussion, and consideration."23
The Commission took a strong position against regarding
children's lawyers as fiduciaries. 24 It said no more about this
topic and one is left to understand that the Commission simply
20. "'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, 'it
means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less.' 'The question is,' said
Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.' 'The question
is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master-that's all."' LEWIS CARROLL,
THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS & WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 269 (Martin Gardner
ed., Random House 1990) (1960).
21. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 39.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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meant that the special oversight responsibilities attendant with
court appointments of fiduciaries need not apply to the appoint-
ment of children's lawyers. 25 Though judges are to decide when
to appoint children's lawyers, the Commission "unequivocally
states that it is essential that such appointments be fair and
unbiased., 26
The Commission recommended expanded training of
judges, court personnel, and lawyers seeking court appoint-
ments as attorneys for children because many of these key ac-
tors need, in the Commission's view, "a better understanding of
the role of the attorney who represents the child."27 Without
further explanation, the Commission found "gender bias" on the
part of appointed attorneys for the child,28 and called for greater
training for children's lawyers with a specific recommendation
that it include "addressing one's own biases."29
It also found the "recurring problem" of courts' improper
"expectations regarding the role of the attorney for the child,"
stressing that "[tihe court should not ask an attorney for the
child for a recommendation or personal opinion." 30 "Essential"
judicial training should include instructing judges about child
development issues and advising them not to "make improper
requests for recommendations by the attorney for the child," or
to "unduly rely on or delegate any judicial responsibilities to
any attorney involved in the litigation, including the attorney
for the child."31 The Commission also clarified that courts "shall
not engage in ex parte communications," with anyone including
the child's lawyer. 32 Nor should courts "request that the attor-
ney for the child select the forensic expert" or "request reports
prepared by the attorney for the child."33
Finally, the Commission commented on the practice of pay-
ment for children's lawyers and found the system statewide to
25. Id.
26. Id. at 41.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 43.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 44.
32. Id.
33. Id.
[Vol. 27:785
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be inconsistent.34 To achieve statewide uniformity on this, it
recommended that the Office of Court Administration "seek to
amend the Domestic Relations Law, the Family Court Act and
the Judiciary Law, to expressly empower courts with the discre-
tion to direct parents with sufficient means to pay the fee of the
attorney for the child."35 It also recommended that courts set
forth in their appointment order "the allocation of fees, the
source of payment, the attorney's hourly rate, the frequency and
reporting process of billing, the means for enforcement of pay-
ment, and any other relevant factors that will eliminate conflict
in connection with the appointment of an attorney for the
child."36
Undoubtedly, one of the weaknesses in the Commission's
work is that it was the product of professionals closely associ-
ated with New York courts. This not only meant the wholesale
endorsement of prior works produced by the Appellate Division
Law Guardian Program and the New York State Bar Associa-
tion, but, in addition, only one who works within that system
could write seriously "commend[ing] the work of the OCA, the
Appellate Divisions and others in educating and training
judges, court personnel and those seeking appointments as at-
torneys for children."37 In fact, New York practice regarding
law guardians has a very troubled history, characterized by an
almost complete lack of clarity. The leading commentator on
New York practice in the area, Professor Merril Sobie, puts it
this way: "The age old question is what the law guardian
should do when faced with such conflict-advocate wishes, pur-
sue interests, or conform closely to the statute's precise words
by trying to accomplish the ludicrous, simultaneously advocat-
ing conflicting wishes and interest."38
One wonders exactly what the Commission was praising so
highly given its findings that even though law guardians have
been used in thousands of matrimonial cases in New York, "par-
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 45.
37. Id. at 41.
38. Merril Sobie, Supplemental Practice Commentary, N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT
§ 241 (McKinney 2003).
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ties often lack a full understanding of the duties and obligations
of the attorney for the child."39
II. What the Commission Omitted from its Work
Lawyers for children present special concerns not ordina-
rily present when one is considering lawyers for other clients.
We need to consider carefully even the most basic issues. When
one is discussing whether to require a lawyer for an adult, in
contrast, we know all of the fundamental parameters. Thus,
when deciding whether adults should be able to obtain routine
appointment of counsel, we already know what we mean. Law-
yers, as agents for their principals, take their instruction from
their clients. 40 Adult clients have the authority, in the words of
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, to "make deci-
sions" that "are binding on [their] lawyer[s] ."41
Everything is different when we are considering giving law-
yers to children. Even the most basic understanding of the pur-
pose and role of the assignment is absent. For this reason, a
series of vital questions need to be addressed. Most prominent
among these are the reasons for the appointment, the purposes
hoped to be served by it, and the anticipated role of counsel
(which will follow logically from these two prior considerations).
It is a fundamental failure of logical ordering to begin, as the
Commission does, with the conclusion that courts should assign
counsel for children in legal proceedings. This conclusion may
be correct, but, at the very least, we are unable to know until we
have carefully examined the reasons and purposes for the ap-
pointment. Regrettably, the Commission eschewed these ante-
cedent questions.
39. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 41-42.
40. Both the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility are unambiguous in setting forth the role of counsel when
representing a competent client. Rule 1.2(a) of the Model Rules requires that law-
yers for competent adults "abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2002).
41. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1983) (provides that "the
authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the client and, if made within the
framework of the law, such decisions are binding on his lawyer").
[Vol. 27:785794
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Considerable scholarly attention has focused on these vital
questions over the past decade. 42 In addition, two important
national organizations developed Standards for the appoint-
ment and conduct of lawyers for children in custody proceed-
ings. The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (in
1995)43 and the American Bar Association (in 2003),4 4 developed
extensive Standards for the practicing Bar regarding custody
cases.45 The Commission's recommendations deviate substan-
tially from these works. By itself, this may not be troubling.
Each jurisdiction should be free to decide what constitutes best
practices in this area. The troubling aspect of the Commission's
work, however, is that it does not engage with these prior
works. One can only know what the Commission recommends;
the Commission's Report entirely omits its reasoning, and, par-
ticularly, its reasons for rejecting the work of others.
Perhaps the first thing to stand out when comparing the
Commission's Report with the work of the American Academy
of Matrimonial Lawyers is that the Commission's Report ex-
presses a "preference" for appointing lawyers for children. 46
AAML Standard 1.1 explicitly rejects the general call for law-
yers to routinely represent children in matrimonial cases. 47 In
the AAML's view, representatives for children, whether counsel
or guardians ad litem, may be appropriate in particular cases.
Other than in those cases, however, appointing representatives
42. See generally Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (1996). In December 1995, Fordham University Law
School hosted a national conference on representing children. More than seventy
lawyers, judges, legal scholars, and representatives of other professions partici-
pated in the conference, which resulted in the publication of a special issue dis-
cussing ethical issues in the legal representation of children. See Bruce A. Green
& Bernardine Dohrn, Foreword: Children & the Ethical Practice of Law, 64 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1281, 1283 (1996).
43. AAML Standards, supra note 9. I should point out, for purposes of fair
disclosure, that I served as the Reporter for these Standards.
44. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9.
45. In 2006, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws promulgated uniform standards for the appointment of lawyers for children
in custody proceedings. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE, NEGLECT,
AND CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS ACT (2006), http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/
probono/nccusl-act-rep-children.pdf. Since these standards were published after
the Commission's Report, they will not be considered here.
46. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 41.
47. See AAML Standards, supra note 9, at 1.
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for children does not necessarily better serve them and may ad-
versely affect the other parties to the action. In the absence of a
particular reason for assigning representation for a child, the
representative frequently will merely duplicate the efforts of
counsel already appearing in the case.48
In contrast, the Commission's Report expresses "a prefer-
ence for the appointment of an attorney for the child in such
disputes,"49 even encouraging judges to appoint more than one
child's lawyer "when conflicts exist in representing more than
one child in the family."50 Although it leaves the decision to ap-
point an attorney for a child to the court's discretion in each
case, it does not go far enough to clarify when the court should
exercise its discretion. 51
Though there may be good justifications for appointing
counsel for children in custody proceedings, including protect-
ing the child from harm associated with acrimonious litigation,
interpreting and clarifying issues for the child, ensuring the
child an opportunity to be heard, and helping the court reach
the best outcome for the child,52 there are also reasons to have
reservations about using children's lawyers. Some worry that
placing children at the center of their parents' dispute by
stressing the importance of their preference to the outcome the
court will reach is bad for them and that child custody law was
developed to protect children from being made to feel responsi-
48. AAML Standards, supra note 9, Standard 1.1 cmt., at 2.
49. MATRmMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 41. It leaves the de-
cision to appoint an attorney for a child to the court's discretion in each case. Id.
50. Id. at 44.
51. The Commission instructs judges to consider such factors as "whether or
not the parties are represented by counsel, the degree of acrimony between the
parties, the presence of issues or allegations of domestic violence and/or substance
abuse, requests for relocation, allegations of child abuse or neglect, a parent's un-
fitness, and the age and maturity of the child." Id. at 41.
52. See, e.g., Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking Ahead: An Empowerment Per-
spective on the Rights of Children, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1585, 1600-01 (1995); Martin
Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for Children, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1399, 1427-28 (1996); Martin Guggenheim, The Making of Stan-
dards for Representing Children in Custody and Visitation Proceedings: The Re-
porter's Perspective, 13 J. AM. AcAD. MATRIM. LAw. 35, 40-41 (1995); Ann M.
Haralambie & Deborah L. Glaser, Practical and Theoretical Problems with the
AAML Standards for Representing "Impaired" Children, 13 J. AM. AcAD. MATRIMO-
NIAL LAW. 57, 64 (1995).
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ble for choosing where to live.53 Others worry from the opposite
direction. Instead of a concern about over-empowering chil-
dren, they worry that assigning children with lawyers means
that lawyers ultimately get to choose which position to
advocate. 54
The principal danger children's lawyers bring is that they
will conclude what is best for their clients based on invisible
factors that have more to tell us about the values and beliefs of
the lawyers than about what is good for the children. 55 The
AAML in particular recognized the dangers associated with
freeing lawyers to advocate for the result they deem best. The
AAML chose the simple and elegant device of prohibiting all
children's lawyers, including those labeled as "guardians ad li-
tem," from advocating for a result that is not derived from what
their clients instructed. The AAML distinguishes between two
types of clients for children's lawyers. When the client is
"unimpaired,"56 the lawyers are obliged to let the client set the
objectives for the case. When the client is "impaired,"57 chil-
53. Some scholars have recognized the difficulties posed by making the child's
preference in a custody-related case a focus of attention. See, e.g., Martin Guggen-
heim, Counseling Counsel for Children, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1488, 1492 n.8 (1999)
(reviewing JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PRO-
CEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS (1997)); Kim J. Landsman &
Martha L. Minow, Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in
Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 YALE L.J. 1126, 1165
(1978).
54. See, e.g., Martin Guggenheim, The Making of Standards for Representing
Children in Custody and Visitation Proceedings: The Reporter's Perspective, 13 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 35, 45-49 (1995); Martin Guggenheim, Reconsidering the
Need for Counsel for Children in Custody, Visitation and Child Protection Proceed-
ings, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 299, 327 n.129 (1998); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to
Be Represented but Not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children,
59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76, 100-07, 123-24 (1984).
55. See, e.g., Martin Guggenheim, The Making of Standards for Representing
Children in Custody and Visitation Proceedings: The Reporter's Perspective, 13 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 35, 51 (1995); Martin Guggenheim, Reconsidering the
Need for Counsel for Children in Custody, Visitation and Child Protection Proceed-
ings, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 299, 318-19 n.79 (1998).
56. AAML Standards, supra note 9, Standard 2.4, at 16.
57. AAML Standards, supra note 9, Standard 2.7, at 19. The Standards,
promulgated in 1995, were based on the then-current language from Rule 1.14 of
the MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (2001) which discussed the duties of
counsel when representing a client whose "ability to make adequately considered
decisions in connection with the representation is impaired." The Rule was
amended in 2002, eliminating the word "impaired," and describing the duties of
counsel when representing a client whose "capacity to make adequately considered
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dren's lawyers are not constrained to advocate for what their
client wants. But they may never advocate for a result against
what their client wants, even if they choose not to advocate for
the client's preference. 58
The ABA Standards build off of the AAML's but ultimately
take a materially different tack. Like the AAML, the ABA
Standards ordinarily require that the lawyer be guided by the
client's choice of objectives. Children's lawyers are ordinarily
required by the ABA Standards to advocate for the result
sought by clients who, in the lawyer's judgment, are capable of
making adequately considered decisions. The Commission in-
structs lawyers to ascertain whether, in their opinion, the
child's views are the product of a "knowing, voluntary and con-
sidered" judgment. 59 As we shall see, this proves to be an invi-
tation for children's lawyers in New York to infuse their own
beliefs into their representation to a degree these national stan-
dards do not tolerate.
Unlike the AAML, however, and in accordance with the
Commission, the ABA Standards authorize children's lawyers
in certain circumstances to advocate for the best interests of the
child. In order not to confuse these two radically different roles,
however, the ABA Standards divided the roles into two parts.
In the first, a "Child's Attorney" is a lawyer who "represents the
child as a client"60 bound by the client's preferences. These law-
yers serve their clients as agents for them. 61 Whenever a child's
lawyer is expected to advocate for the child's best interests, that
decisions in connection with a representation is diminished." MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.14 (2006).
58. See AAML Standards, supra note 9, Standard 2.7, at 19. ("When a child
client, by virtue of his or her impairment, is unable to set the goals of representa-
tion, the child's lawyer shall not advocate a position with regard to the outcome of
the proceeding or issues contested during the litigation."). See also AAML Stan-
dards, supra note 9, Standard 3.2, at 29.
59. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 40 (quoting Appel-
late Division, Second, Third and Fourth Departments, Law Guardian Program Ad-
ministrative Handbook (2004), http://nycourts.gov/ad4/lglg_2004handbook.pdf
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
60. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, II. B. cmt., at 2.
61. The child's attorney "should abide by the client's decisions about the objec-
tives of the representation with respect to each issue on which the child is compe-
tent to direct the lawyer, and does so." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, IV. C., at 11.
The Commentary makes plain that "the child is entitled to determine the overall
objectives to be pursued." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, IV. C. cmt., at 11.
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lawyer is to be known as a "Best Interests Attorney." 62 Recog-
nizing the huge difference between them, the ABA Standards
prohibit the lawyer from being a combination of the two.63 Go-
ing even further to ensure no ambiguity, the ABA Standards
insist that at every hearing either the judge or the lawyer clar-
ify which kind of lawyer is appearing. 64
In contrast, the Commission did not even acknowledge the
possibility that children's lawyers might advocate for their cli-
ents' best interests, much less discuss the dangers of authoriz-
ing lawyers to play this role. Although the Commission
endorses a definition of "law guardian" that allows lawyers to
advocate for a position opposite from the child's wishes, it re-
peatedly emphasizes that children's lawyers should advocate
the children's wishes, thereby almost pretending children's law-
yers have no other significant role to perform.
In place of an examination of the dangers associated with
advocating for children's best interests, the Commission chose
rhetoric emphasizing a child empowerment theme. One gets
the strong impression that the Commission wants (or wants
readers to believe it wants) children's lawyers whenever possi-
ble to be "ordinary" lawyers striving to achieve the objectives
set by their clients. This impression is obtained from the very
beginning: "children's lawyers are lawyers" we are emphatically
told by the State Bar Standards relied upon by the Commission.
The Commission's First Principle, is that "the law guardian is
the attorney for the child."65 To make this even more emphatic,
the Commission eschews the term "law guardian," choosing in-
stead simply to refer to all court-appointed lawyers in these
cases as the "attorney for the child."66 This is remarkable since
62. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, II. B. 2, at 2; see also Linda D. Elrod, Coun-
sel for the Child in Custody Disputes: The Time is Now, 26 FAI. L.Q. 105, 119-22
(describing the roles of child's attorneys and best interests attorneys as set forth in
the ABA Standards).
63. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, II. B. cmt., III. B. cmt., at 2, 3.
64. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, III. G. cmt., at 7.
65. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 39 (quoting Appel-
late Division, Second, Third and Fourth Departments, Law Guardian Program Ad-
ministrative Handbook (2004), http://nycourts.gov/ad4lg/lg-2004handbook.pdf
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
66. Id. at 39 (quoting Appellate Division, Second, Third and Fourth Depart-
ments, Law Guardian Program Administrative Handbook (2004), http://nycourts.
gov/ad4/lg/lg_2004handbook.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted)). Since the
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the controlling statute,67 and caselaw, 68 exclusively speak in
terms of "law guardians." By preferring "attorney for the child,"
the Commission seeks to avoid the ambiguity inherent in being
a "guardian," reinforcing the sense that the Commission prefers
children's lawyers to be guided by what their clients instruct.69
This impression is strengthened by an early emphasis on
children's rights. In the very first paragraph in the children's
lawyer section, the Commission writes, "the attorney for the
child, as the children's independent advocate, generally must
take a position based upon the children's wishes and convey
that position to the court."70 This is designed to leave us with
the understanding that the attorney for the child in custody
proceedings ("generally") has the straightforward duty to em-
power children. The final point of emphasis made by the Com-
mission is its warning to judges against seeking
recommendations from children's lawyers, insisting that
"court[s] should not ask an attorney for the child for a recom-
mendation or personal opinion... [because] the attorney for the
child is not an arm of the court or a fiduciary and... he or she
must advocate on that child's behalf as is required of any other
attorney in a civil proceeding."71
It is as if the Commission denied the pertinence of any con-
cern associated with empowering children's lawyers to advocate
a child's best interests by denying that children's lawyers in
Commission has chosen to eschew the term "law guardian," I shall do the same
throughout this article. I do this to be fair to the Commission's work, even though
I fear some readers will be confused because the controlling statutes and case law
all continue to use the term.
67. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 241 (McKinney 2006).
68. See, e.g., infra note 113.
69. The Commission recommends amending all relevant statutes, court rules,
and regulations to replace the term "law guardian" with the term "attorney for the
child" to change "perceptions held about... the role of attorneys who represent the
children." MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at iv. This recom-
mendation further highlights the Commission's insistence on changing language
without exploring the reasons for and implications of such change.
70. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 39.
71. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 43. The Commission
rescinds this admonition almost immediately by insisting only that judges "not
make improper requests for recommendations by the attorney for the child." Id. at
44 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Commission stresses that "[tihe attorney for
the child is expected, however, to take a position in the litigation-in accordance
with the considerations outlined earlier-and to use every appropriate means to
advance that position." Id. at 43-44.
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New York have very much discretion to choose the result they
wish. But this is plainly incorrect. Indeed, there simply is no
way around just how the New York Standards endorsed by the
Commission empower children's lawyers, not children.72
The real question which the Commission should have ad-
dressed is whether, all things considered, more is gained or lost
by encouraging lawyers to assess for themselves what best
serves the child. Perhaps the question is closer than I take it to
be. From my perspective as a practicing lawyer for more than
35 years, the dangers associated with freeing lawyers in this
way are far greater than what anyone has to gain by their use.
I readily accept that I may be wrong. But nothing the Commis-
sion has said would allow me to recognize the errors of my ways
because the Commission appears to be oblivious to even the pos-
sibility that children's lawyers may contaminate the fair admin-
istration of justice.
Although the Report emphasizes the ordinariness expected
from children's lawyers, I wish to demonstrate that the tradi-
tional role of a child's lawyer in New York is anything but ordi-
nary. Despite the Commission's effort to obfuscate the point, I
hope to show that children's lawyers are expected to recommend
to the court the outcome they believe will serve their clients
best interests and that the Commission has not advocated any
significant change from this role and purpose of children's law-
yers. This is so for three reasons. First, adjusting the process
by which courts decide custody disputes by making it more
likely that they will decide custody disputes in accordance with
what children want would be starkly at odds with the purpose
of custody dispute resolution. Second, and related to this, New
York courts would not tolerate setting loose a cadre of children's
lawyers whose principal function was to strive single-mindedly
to achieve the result desired by the child. Third, and perhaps
most tellingly, as we have already seen, the State Bar Stan-
dards defining the tasks to be performed by children's lawyers,
which were endorsed by the Commission as authoritative, pro-
vide otherwise.
72. See infra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
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III. The Proper Weight Due a Child's Preferences According
to New York Law
New York law is unambiguous in requiring that courts de-
termine custody matters "solely" based on "what is for the best
interest of the child, and what will best promote its welfare and
happiness."73 The New York Court of Appeals has made clear
there are no rigid rules or absolutes governing custody determi-
nations.74 Rather, courts have developed a list of factors to con-
sider in ascertaining which outcome will most likely serve the
child's best interests. 75 The child's preference is merely one of
the many factors that courts should consider. Other factors in-
clude, in no particular order: (1) the relative fitness of each
party; (2) the emotional bond between the child and each party;
(3) the length of time the child has lived in a stable environ-
ment; (4) each party's ability to provide for the child's emotional
and intellectual development; (5) the financial status of each
party; (6) the individual needs of the child; (7) the degree to
which the custodial determination would interrupt the child's
day-to-day life; (8) the willingness of each party to facilitate a
relationship between the child and the other party; and (9) any
other relevant factor, such as domestic violence or substance
abuse. 76 Individual courts have revised this list from time to
time. 77 No test exists for telling a court with any great precision
73. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 70 (McKinney 2006). See also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 240 (McKinney 2006) ("In all cases there shall be no prima facie right to the
custody of the child in either parent.").
74. Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 432 N.E.2d 765, 767 (N.Y. 1982) ("The only
absolute in the law governing custody of children is that there are no absolutes.").
75. Id. at 768 ("The standard ultimately to be applied remains the best inter-
ests of the child when all of the applicable factors are considered."); Nehra v.
Uhlar, 372 N.E.2d 4, 7 (N.Y. 1977) ("Paramount in child custody cases, of course, is
the ultimate best interest of the child.").
76. K.D. v. J.D., No. V-16584-03, 2004 WL 1753417, at *6 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. June
30, 2004). See also Ellen K. v. John K., 588 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626 (App. Div. 1992);
Krebsbach v. Gallagher, 587 N.Y.S.2d 346, 347 (App. Div. 1992).
77. See, e.g., Salvatore M. v. Tara C., No. V-11289-04/05 I, 2006 WL 8322539
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. March 2, 2006). The court held that:
In determining the best interest of the child where a change of custody is
sought, the court considers such factors as the original placement of the
child, the length of that placement, relative fitness of parents, quality of
home environment, parental guidance given to the child, parents' financial
status, and parents' ability to provide for the child's emotional and intellec-
tual development.
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how to reach the ultimate conclusion of what outcome will most
likely serve the best interests of the child. But New York law
could not be clearer: the clarion substantive rule concerning the
weight to give a child's views is that it is merely a factor to
which a court should give as much weight as it deems appropri-
ate.78 The best interests test is an amalgam result based on the
totality of the evidence. 79 Although appointing an attorney who
strives to secure the outcome desired by the child furthers the
goal of making the client's wishes known to the court, it may
undermine securing an outcome that will best serve the "child's
interests" as New York defines the phrase.
This is not to suggest that a child's expressed desires are
irrelevant. Indeed, New York courts have become ever more in-
sistent that trial courts ascertain the expressed wishes of the
child before deciding a contested custody case, commonly
through an in camera interview conducted by the judge.80 One
of the surest ways for a trial court to commit reversible error in
a contested custody dispute is to fail to learn the expressed
wishes of the child (though the means by which the court ascer-
Id. at *8 (citations omitted); see also Suzanne T. v. Arthur L.T., 817 N.Y.S.2d 855,
857 (Fam. Ct. 2005).
78. See, e.g., Eschbach v. Eschbach, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 1263 (N.Y. 1982) (hold-
ing that the child's desire is "but one factor to be considered; as with the other
factors, the child's desires should not be considered determinative."); Moore v. Bar-
rett, 786 N.Y.S.2d 825, 827 (App. Div. 2004) (holding that in determining the
child's best interest, "numerous factors, which could include a child's preference,
must be reviewed and weighed."); Cornell v. Cornell, 778 N.Y.S.2d 193, 195 (App.
Div. 2004) ("Although the advanced age of the child tends to render greater weight
to his or her reasoned wishes, the child's preference is but one factor in the best
interests analysis.").
79. See, e.g., Eschbach, 436 N.E.2d at 1264 (stating that in a custody case, the
trial court is required to "review the totality of the circumstances" in determining
child's "best interests"); Friederwitzer, 432 N.E.2d 765, 769 (holding that the court
has the discretion to change custody "when the totality of circumstances ... war-
rants its doing so in the best interests of the child").
80. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Lincoln, 247 N.E.2d 659, 661 (N.Y. 1969) ("[W~e are
convinced that the interests of the child will be best served by granting to the trial
court in a custody proceeding discretion to interview the child in the absence of its
parents or their counsel."); Koppenhoefer v. Koppenhoefer, 558 N.Y.S.2d 596, 599
(App. Div. 1990) ("The preferred practice in a custody/visitation case in order to
determine best interests, is to have an in camera interview with child on the record
in the presence of the Law Guardian."); Reed v. Reed, 734 N.Y.S.2d 806, 809 (Faro.
Ct. 2001) ("It has been well established in this jurisdiction that the appropriate
method to conduct an interview with a child in a custody matter is an in camera
interview.").
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tains this information are more flexible than always conducting
an interview).8' But it is crucial to appreciate that the error
committed is not a failure involving the child's rights. It is a
failure of input. The court's error is the failure to secure poten-
tially relevant data. The entire point of the substantive stan-
dard for deciding a custody dispute in New York is that the
child's expressed preference is datum courts must consider in
reaching their ultimate conclusion regarding the child's inter-
ests.8 2 But it is no more consistent with New York law for a
court to decide the case based solely on the child's expressed
wishes8 3 than it would be for a court to refuse to consider them.
Not only are courts free to decide custody cases opposite
from what the children have stated they want, but appellate
courts comfortably affirm such results, rejecting the claim that
the court failed to take into account wishes of children8 4 Thus,
in Roberts v. Roberts,8 5 a fourteen-year-old girl and twelve-year-
old boy claimed that the trial court erred by ignoring their
wishes. The appellate court disagreed, emphasizing the distinc-
tion between factoring into the ultimate decision the children's
81. See, e.g., Koppenhoefer, 558 N.Y.S.2d at 599 (reversing trial court where
fourteen- and twelve-year-old children had no opportunity to communicate their
preferences to the court in custody and visitation case); Feldman v. Feldman, 396
N.Y.S.2d 879, 881 (App. Div. 1977) (reversing trial court where court failed to con-
sult sixteen-year-old before determining custody and visitation rights). See also
Spain v. Spain, 515 N.Y.S.2d 134, 136 (App. Div. 1987) ("In view of the paucity of
information in this record and the failure of the court to interview the child, there
is little on which to base a judgment with regard to the best interest of the child.").
82. See, e.g., Eschbach, 436 N.E.2d at 1263 ("While not determinative, the
child's expressed preference is some indication of what is in the child's best inter-
ests."). The sole concern of the court in a custody dispute is which resolution will
best serve the best interests of the subject children by promoting the children's
welfare, happiness, and optimum development. See id. at 1262-63; Friederwitzer,
432 N.E.2d at 767-68; Nehra v. Uhlar, 372 N.E.2d 4, 5 (N.Y. 1977); Teuschler v.
Teuschler, 660 N.Y.S.2d 744, 746 (App. Div. 1997) (citing Dintruff v. McGreevy,
316 N.E.2d 716 (N.Y. 1974) ("Although a child's preference may be indicative of
what is in the child's best interests, it is not determinative.")).
83. The case law is replete with holdings ordering a custodial arrangement at
odds with the stated preferences of the children, even when the children are teen-
agers. See, e.g., Smoczkiewicz v Smoczkiewicz, 770 N.Y.S.2d 101 (App. Div. 2003)
(affirming court order denying change in custody despite thirteen-year-old's prefer-
ence); Johnston v. Bridenbecker, 752 N.Y.S.2d 496, 496-97 (App. Div. 2002) (re-
versing lower court's custody order to reach result contrary to children's desires);
Jordan v. Jordan, 732 N.Y.S.2d 478, 479 (App. Div. 2001).
84. See Roberts v. Roberts, 505 N.Y.S.2d 215, 216 (App. Div. 1986).
85. Id.
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wishes and relying on them as the basis for the result. The chil-
dren's wishes-even of fourteen- and twelve-year-olds-are
heard "not to bind the courts, but to guide them in determining
what is in the best interests of the children."' 6
It is true that courts are supposed to give more weight to
older children's wishes than to those of younger children.87
Case law commonly repeats the notion that older and mature
children's expressed wishes are entitled to "great weight."88 But
it is equally true that courts are expected to exercise their inde-
86. Id. at 216.
87. Eschbach, 436 N.E.2d at 1263-64 ("While not determinative, the child's
expressed preference is some indication of what is in the child's best interests. Of
course, in weighing this factor, the court must consider the age and maturity of the
child and the potential for influence having been exerted on the child.").
88. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Dyer, 795 N.Y.S.2d 686, 687 (App. Div. 2005) (quot-
ing Koppenhoefer v. Koppenhoefer, 558 N.Y.S.2d 596, 599 (App. Div. 1990)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). There is no magic age of maturity. One court has
characterized fourteen as "the age of preference." Suzanne T. v. Arthur L.T., 817
N.Y.S.2d 855, 857 (Fam. Ct. 2005). However, there are many examples of courts
deciding cases contrary to what children fourteen and even older want. See, e.g.,
Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 791 N.Y.S.2d 562 (App. Div. 2005) (reversing trial court or-
der despite fifteen-year-old's desire to live with father); Moore v. Barrett, 786
N.Y.S.2d 825, 827 (App. Div. 2004) (deciding contrary to sixteen-year-old's desire
since "such preference, even from a child of this age, will not be determinative");
McTighe v. Pearl, 778 N.Y.S.2d 588, 590 (App. Div. 2004) (affirming custody order
at odds with fourteen-year-old's desire); Juliano v. Pollack, 681 N.Y.S.2d 159, 160
(App. Div. 1998) (upholding denial of custody modification for fourteen-year-old
even though "all parties were aware of his contentions and his desire" for modifica-
tion); McCrocklin v. McCrocklin, 430 N.Y.S.2d 320, 321 (App. Div. 1980) ("While
we observe that the wishes of a child of Colleen's age [151 and presumed maturity
must be considered, they are not necessarily dispositive of the custody issue."). See
also Cornell v. Cornell, 778 N.Y.S.2d 193 (App. Div. 2004) (holding "erroneous"
family court's view that fifteen-year-old's "wishes should be dispositive"). Courts
routinely hold that children as old as ten, eleven, and even twelve years "generally
[are] not of sufficient maturity to weigh intelligently the factors essential to mak-
ing a wise choice as to custody." Fox v. Fox, 582 N.Y.S.2d 863, 864 (App. Div. 1992).
See, e.g., Robert T.F. v. Rosemary F., 538 N.Y.S.2d 605, 607 (App. Div. 1989) (not-
ing that eleven-year-old's wishes are not determinative and court "must not lose
sight of the child's age and vulnerability to be influenced by the noncustodial par-
ent"); Ferguson v. Ressico, 510 N.Y.S.2d 275, 277 (App. Div. 1986) (affirming trial
court's order despite contrary desire of eleven-year-old child); Roberts v. Roberts,
505 N.Y.S.2d 215 (App. Div. 1986); Feltman v. Feltman, 471 N.Y.S.2d 619, 620
(App. Div. 1984) (citing Martin v. Martin, 427 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (App. Div. 1980)
("The child's preference to live with her mother is not determinative in this case
because a child of 11 is not mature enough to weigh intelligently the factors neces-
sary to make a wise choice as to her custody.").
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pendent judgment in reaching the ultimate decision.8 9 When, if
ever, children's desires tip the balance for a court is always to
be decided by the judge. A rule that children's views are enti-
tled to precisely as much (or little) weight as the judge deems
appropriate should not be confused with empowering children.90
There are several reasons why the expressed wishes of a
child are not binding on the court. One is that a substantive
rule that the child's stated preferences are controlling would
mean that the focus of the case would shift from the overall
facts to a single criterion: what the child will tell the judge.91
This, in turn, would mean that the parents would have an in-
centive to place a terrible burden on the child, fixing the child at
the very center of the controversy in contravention of every-
thing psychologists tell us is good for children.92 The Court of
89. See, e.g., Jordan, 732 N.Y.S.2d at 479 (holding that in the absence of a
showing that "visitation would result in significant emotional harm to the chil-
dren," it was error for Family Court to have awarded visitation based upon the
adolescent children's desires).
90. Even when courts are inclined to uphold an order granting or denying visi-
tation or custody which happens to comport with the child's preferences, it is com-
mon for the appellate courts in New York to stress that "the stated desires of the
children with respect to visitation are not determinative." Jabri v. Jabri, 598
N.Y.S.2d 535, 537 (App. Div. 1993). In Jabri, the court ended up affirming the
trial court's order, but, in doing so, saw fit to remind everyone that, even though
the order conditioned visitation upon the children's willingness to participate, it
"decline[d] to disturb the visitation order at this time, considering the fact that the
youngest of the children is now 16 years old, and in view of the psychiatric testi-
mony which indicates that compulsory visitation would not be in their best inter-
ests." Id.
91. See, e.g., Dintruffv. McGreevy, 316 N.E.2d 716, 716 (N.Y. 1974) ("While a
child's view should be considered to ascertain his attitude and to lead to relevant
facts, it should not be determinative. If it were, then all a court would be required
to decide is whether his preference of parent is voluntary and untainted and then
follow the child's wish."); Metz v. Morley, 289 N.Y.S.2d 364, 368 (App. Div. 1968)
("We may not abdicate the function of this court to determine what is in the best
interest of the child and permit the youngster to be the sole judge of her own wel-
fare."); Hahn v. Falce, 289 N.Y.S.2d 100, 109 (Fam. Ct. 1968) ("[Iun the case of a 10-
year-old child whose preference for one parent or the other can be so easily influ-
enced by discipline or the lack of it, or by the denial or gratification of childish
desires the wishes of the child are not ... controlling, and will not deter the court
from making a contrary determination if in the court's judgment, the best interests
of the child require it. Any other policy would be practically to abandon the juris-
diction of the court and make the child the sole judge of his own best interests and
welfare.").
92. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. See also Miosky v. Miosky,
2006 WL 3025811, at *4 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 26, 2006) (reversing trial court order
where "Family Court should not have relegated visitation to the younger daugh-
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Appeals has recognized that this could result in "distortive ma-
nipulation by a bitter, or perhaps even well-meaning, parent."93
But New York rejects a rule that the child's wishes are con-
trolling for even more basic reasons. Rarely, anywhere in the
law, are a child's desires binding on adults.94 To the contrary,
all of the really important decisions about children are vested in
adults responsible for their upbringing to make for them. Par-
ents possess the authority to raise children as they see fit, to
give as much weight to children's preferences as the parents
deem appropriate, but ultimately to make decisions for children
without being constrained by the children's desires. 95
The law of divorce does not change this fundamental rela-
tionship between children and the law. Judges responsible for
deciding contested custody disputes step into the shoes of par-
ents when deciding these cases. They are charged with the duty
of advancing the children's interests. But custody cases are not
about empowering children. Wise judges, like wise parents,
would not want to make decisions on behalf of children without
knowing what the children think. But the children's thoughts
merely are helpful to the adult decision-maker. As the Court of
Appeals has said, among the reasons courts are not bound by
children's expressed wishes in deciding custody cases is that
ter's wishes, as she was clearly caught in the crossfire and under undue influence"
from parent); Bergson v. Bergson, 414 N.Y.S.2d 593, 594 (App. Div. 1979) (modify-
ing a joint custody order that had allowed 15-year-old to choose between his par-
ents because "[t]o lodge such discretion in the child would make him the focal point
of family discord and subject him to undue pressure").
93. Nehra v. Uhlar, 372 N.E.2d 4, 7 (N.Y. 1977).
94. The outstanding exception involves pregnant minors. See Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) (concluding that "if the State decides to require a
pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents' consent to an abortion, it also must
provide an alternative procedure whereby authorization for the abortion can be
obtained" without parental consent); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
74 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a state law provision requiring a parent's con-
sent for an unmarried minor seeking an abortion, noting that the "State may not
impose a blanket provision ... requiring the consent of a parent or person in loco
parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried minor"). But, as I have sug-
gested elsewhere, even this exception tells us less about children's rights than
about the complicated story of fights between adults over an important public
health choice. See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
224-44 (2005); Martin Guggenheim, Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases,
30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 589 (2002).
95. See, e.g., MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
38 (2005).
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children's views "do not always reflect the long-term best inter-
est of the children."96
IV. What Judges in New York Expect from
Children's Lawyers
As we have already seen, the progenitor of appointing law-
yers for children in custody cases was Braiman v. Braiman.97
Braiman could not be confused with any kind of call for lawyers
in order to empower children. Rather, Chief Judge Breital
viewed the court-appointed guardian as a lawyer "who would be
charged with the responsibility of close investigation and explo-
ration of the truth on the issues and perhaps even of recom-
mending by way of report alternative resolutions for the court
to consider."98
96. Nehra, 372 N.E.2d at 7. See also Lincoln v. Lincoln, 247 N.E.2d 659, 661
(N.Y. 1969) ("A child whose home is or has been torn apart is subjected to emo-
tional stresses that may produce completely distorted images of its parents and its
situation. Also its feelings may be transient indeed, and the reasons for its prefer-
ences may indicate that no weight should be given the child's choice."). Some-
times, trial courts forget that their role is to decide independently what result best
serves the children's interests (or, perhaps, simply stress too much that their deci-
sion is based on the "strong desires" of the children). When this occurs, courts are
especially likely to reverse trial court orders, if only to remind all of the supremacy
of the judges' power to decide the case. See, e.g., Fox v. Fox, 582 N.Y.S.2d 863, 864
(App. Div. 1992) (holding that it was "improper" to change custody of child "be-
cause of the 'strong desires' of the 10-year-old daughter to live with her mother."
Court requires a showing that the child "is possessed of exceptional judgment or
maturity to decide her custodial fate."). Courts are particularly likely to reverse
trial court orders based on the child's preferences when the court acted "without
the benefit of an investigative report and without the testimony of teachers, coun-
selors, psychologists or other experts." Id. (citing Mead v. Mead, 532 N.Y.S.2d 449
(App. Div. 1988)). See also Calder v. Woolverton, 375 N.Y.S.2d 150 (App. Div.
1975), affd, 355 N.E.2d 306 (N.Y. 1976); Barry v. Glynn, 297 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Fam.
Ct. 1969)). In other words, children's preferences come to matter if, but not unless,
they are supported by expert testimony or other more objective data. See Barry v.
Glynn, 297 N.Y.S.2d 786, 790 (Fam. Ct. 1969) ("[I]n choosing between two good
homes each of which seems to make [the child] thrive, but one of which she
strongly prefers, this particular child's welfare at age 11 requires, as our expert
witness maintains, deferring to her unwavering wishes."); Sciartelli v. Sciartelli,
528 N.Y.S.2d 443, 444 (App. Div. 1988) (affirming order in accordance with adoles-
cents' preferences where "the Law Guardian and a court-appointed clinical psy-
chologist recommended" the same outcome as the children).
97. 378 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 1979).
98. Id. at 1022. The two children were seven-and-a-half and six-years-old. Id.
at 1019.
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Braiman had three characteristics deeply at odds with em-
powering children. First, it did not even envision this person
being the children's lawyer; a guardian ad litem was all that it
desired. In addition, it assigned the guardian with two tasks:
Explore the truth for the court and, "perhaps even" make a rec-
ommendation to the trial judge of how to decide the case. Taken
together, this means that, at least when the Court of Appeals
first expressed a view on the subject, it regarded the court-ap-
pointed professional as an aide of the court, not as an attorney
for the child. Nor did the Court of Appeals regard the child as
anyone's client. The notion that children's lawyers are more ap-
propriately viewed as court aides than children's lawyers has
deep resonance in the case law.
Trial and appellate judges recognize that getting at the
true facts in many cases can be difficult. Understandably,
courts want any help they can get. For many judges deciding
complex custody cases, this neutral child's lawyer is just what
they are looking for to help them determine the best interests of
the child. Anyone familiar with cases involving children who
fails to understand this is missing the real point. Consider how
common it is for appellate courts to emphasize that the child's
lawyer recommended the result reached by the appellate court.
The Court of Appeals presents a prominent example. Thus, in
In re Ray A.M.,99 the Court of Appeals upheld an order termi-
nating parental rights. In doing so, it added gratuitously, "It is
significant too that the Law Guardian for the child.., has sub-
mitted a useful and thoughtful brief and argument, urging" this
outcome. 100 "Since the child obviously cannot speak for herself,"
the court observed, "this highly competent neutral submission
is reassuring. " 10 Does anyone seriously believe the court would
have been impressed by the legal position advocated by the
child's lawyer if it understood that the position was merely the
product of the child's wishes? No one should expect children's
lawyers suddenly to cease advocating the children's best inter-
ests given what judges expect from them. If lawyers for chil-
dren started to fight unswervingly to achieve the outcome
preferred by the child, courts would stop paying careful atten-
99. 339 N.E.2d 135 (N.Y. 1975).
100. Id. at 138.
101. Id.
809
25
810 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:785
tion to what the children's lawyers were saying. Even more,
courts would be reluctant to bother appointing children's law-
yers in the first place.
A very large part of the value of children's lawyers, whether
to the Court of Appeals or to trial judges, is the "reassuring"
quality that the result the law guardian chose to advocate com-
ports with the result the court chose to reach. Thus, the Court
of Appeals, in In re Nathaniel T. ,102 again revealed the comfort
law guardians bring by observing that "both Law Guardians,
court-appointed attorneys whose role was to protect and re-
present the interests of the children, have filed recommenda-
tions and briefs urging that these children have been
permanently neglected and that parental rights should be ter-
minated." 10 3 The same note is commonly sounded in the appel-
late divisions. Courts like children's lawyers because they tend
to offer "relevant and important insights. ' 04
Even a casual reading of courts' descriptions of the child's
lawyer's role reveals how deeply courts perceive the lawyer as
the court's aide. "[Aln important function in furtherance of the
law guardian's role in a child custody proceeding," a trial court
wrote in 2002, "is to uncover and offer evidence which adults
might choose to withhold from the court."10 5 This is powerfully
102. 492 N.E.2d 775 (N.Y. 1986).
103. Id. at 777.
104. Church v. Church, 656 N.Y.S.2d 416, 417 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting Moon
v. Moon, 502 N.Y.S.2d 110, 112 (App. Div. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). See also Grathwol v. Grathwol, 727 N.Y.S.2d 825, 829 (App. Div. 2001) ("We
also note that the Law Guardian's recommendation, although not binding on this
Court, fully supports the determination made by Family Court that it will be in the
child's best interest to be with petitioner."); In re Anthony M., 705 N.Y.S.2d 715,
717 (App. Div. 2000) ("Notably, the Law Guardian appointed to represent the child
... has advocated strongly in support" of what the court holds); Rolls v. Rolls, 663
N.Y.S.2d 345, 347 (App. Div. 1997) (citing Betancourt v. Boughton, 611 N.Y.S.2d
941 (App. Div. 1994)) ("We also note that, although by no means determinative,
Supreme Court's determination that the children should remain living with defen-
dant was in accord with the Law Guardian's recommendation.").
105. Bradt v. White, 740 N.Y.S.2d 777, 780 (Sup. Ct. 2002). See also B.A. v.
L.A., 761 N.Y.S.2d 805, 812 (Fam. Ct. 2003) (citing Koppenhoefer v. Kppenhoefer,
558 N.Y.S.2d 596 (App. Div. 1997); Vecchiarelli v. Vecchiarelli, 656 N.Y.S.2d 337
(App. Div. 1997)) ("Appellate courts have long recognized the dual role of the law
guardian as both the champion of the best interests of their clients and as advo-
cates for their express preferences, if any. This includes being an investigator
seeking truth on controverted issues and as recommenders of alternatives for the
court's considerations.").
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reiterated in Carballeira v. Shumway, a Third Department de-
cision in 2000, which is heavily cited in the case law. 10 6
In Carballeira, the losing parent in a contested custody dis-
pute appealed the final order objecting that the child's lawyer
advocated for a result contrary to the expressed wishes of his
eleven-year-old client. The father conceded that the lawyer
"would be justified in substituting his or her own judgment of
what is in the best interest of a very young child."10 7 His claim
was that when "the represented child is old enough to articulate
his or her wishes, the Law Guardian is required to advocate for
the result desired by the child and prohibited from interjecting
an independent view of what would best meet the child's
needs." 08 The Third Department rejected this "categorical posi-
tion"10 9 explaining that "[t]he Law Guardian, has the statutorily
directed responsibility to represent the child's wishes as well as
to advocate the child's best interest." 10 Because the child's
preference is only "some indication of what is in the child's best
interests,""' "a Law Guardian may properly attempt to per-
suade the court to adopt a position which, in the Law Guard-
ian's independent judgment, would best promote the child's
interest, even if that position is contrary to the wishes of the
child."1 2 Carballeira concluded that the child's lawyer fulfilled
the assignment fully even though he argued for the result oppo-
106. 710 N.Y.S.2d 149, 152-53 (App. Div. 2000). See also Goodfriend v.
Devletsah-Goodfriend, 813 N.Y.S.2d 824, 826 (App. Div. 2006); Vickery v. Vickery,
812 N.Y.S.2d 180, 181-82 (App. Div. 2006); Whitley v. Leonard, 772 N.Y.S.2d 620
(App. Div. 2004); Blangiardo v. Blangiardo, 767 N.Y.S.2d 788, 788 (App. Div.
2003); James MM. v. June 00., 740 N.Y.S.2d 730, 732 (App. Div. 2002).
107. Carballeira, 710 N.Y.S.2d at 151-52.
108. Id. at 152.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. (quoting Eschbach v. Eschbach, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 1263 (N.Y. 1982))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Id. (quoting In re Amikia P., 684 N.Y.S.2d 761, 763 (Fam. Ct. 1999)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). Far from paving new ground, Carballeira merely
restated the long-established understanding by New York courts of the role and
purpose of children's lawyers in custody cases. In 1994, the court in Marquez v.
Presbyterian Hospital, noted that a "consensus in the legal community that there
is an essential duality of the law guardian's role-defense attorney and guardian."
Marquez v. Presbyterian Hospital, 608 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1015 (Sup. Ct. 1994).
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site from what his "certainly intelligent but somewhat less ma-
ture than average" eleven-year-old client wanted.113
Appellate courts in New York expect children's lawyers to
decide for themselves whether to advocate for an outcome op-
posed by the children regardless of the children's age. Since it
was decided in 1990, Koppenhoefer v. Koppenhoefer" 4 has be-
come the most frequently cited case for providing a definition of
a child's lawyer's role. In Koppenheofer, a 16-year-old boy and
his 14-year-old sister were the subjects of a particularly embat-
tled visitation dispute since their parents divorced thirteen
years earlier. When the children were 14 and 12, the trial court
modified the visitation order in favor of the mother, but failed to
interview the children or use a law guardian. The Second De-
partment reversed because "[t]he children were not heard from
directly, or through a Law Guardian."" 5 On remand, the trial
court was directed to conduct further hearings in order to learn
the children's preferences. 1 6 Moreover, the court wrote, the
"appointment of a law guardian... [would have been] appropri-
ate and helpful to the court."" 7 The Second Department as-
signed a very broad set of tasks for the children's lawyer,
leaving to the lawyer which to choose. Children's lawyers, says
the court, "may act as champion of the child's best interest, as
advocate for the child's preferences, as investigator seeking the
113. Carballiera, 710 N.Y.S.2d 149. Especially fascinating is the relationship
between the merits of the case-what the court ultimately believed was in the
child's best interests-and the court's willingness to condone the child's lawyer's
refusal to advocate for a result which he did not personally believe would advance
the child's best interests. The appellate court expressed the concern that the child
was unable to "articulate objective reasons for his preference other than his dislike
of discipline at respondent's home and the lack of rules and discipline at peti-
tioner's home." Id. at 152-53. Once the court was comfortable agreeing with the
trial court's decision, which did not come out in favor of what the child wanted, the
court was primed to conclude that it was also reasonable for the child's lawyer to
conclude that what the child wanted would not serve his best interests and, there-
fore, the lawyer was permitted to advocate for a result that he believed would ad-
vance the child's best interests. Id.
114. 558 N.Y.S.2d 596 (App. Div. 1990).
115. Id. at 598.
116. Id. at 599 ("[In order that more than lip service be accorded the vague
and amorphous concept of best interests, the court must inquire into the emo-
tional, intellectual, physical, and social needs of the children, as well as the chil-
dren's preferences if the children are capable of verbalizing them.").
117. Id.
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truth on controverted issues, or may serve to recommend alter-
natives for the court's consideration. " 118
Caselaw imposes almost no limitations on the discretion ac-
corded to the child's lawyers, beyond that they may not silence
the child. Even this limitation is less a rule about children's
lawyers than about the duty of courts to learn what the child's
wishes are so that the judge will give them appropriate weight.
But children's lawyers are free to argue that what the child
wants would not serve the child well and to recommend any out-
come that seems to the child's lawyer best for the child.
Beyond this, the only thing New York courts insist upon
the child's lawyer doing is something. When children's lawyers
fail to take an active role, appellate courts are quick to re-
verse. 1 9 But so long as they are active, they are free to make of
their appointment what they will, within the boundless choices
of advocating for the child's wishes, neutrally uncovering the
"truth" whether these additional facts would advance or under-
mine the child's wishes, or actively opposing the outcome de-
sired by the child and recommending what the child does not
want.
Courts want the child's representative, whatever the label,
"to bring a mature judgment to the situation and to provide or
arrange for the provision of the manifold services required by a
child who is the subject of a custody proceeding."' 20 Even when
courts have acknowledged that children's lawyers can properly
assert "a position wholly divergent from that ultimately articu-
lated by the trial court or an appellate court," they have empha-
sized that the position the lawyers advocate should not be
"dictate[d]" by their clients.' 2 '
118. Id. at 599-600.
119. See, e.g., Grisanti v. Grisanti, 772 N.Y.S.2d 700, 703 (App. Div. 2004)
(citing the "failure of the Law Guardian to take an active role in the proceedings"
as a reason for remitting for a new fact-finding hearing). See also Williams v. Till-
man, 734 N.Y.S.2d 727, 728 (App. Div. 2001) (citing In re Colleen CC., 648
N.Y.S.2d 754, 756 (App. Div. 1996) (praising the Law Guardians' "active role in the
proceedings" as "a far cry from 'passive representation' which would cause us to
disturb Family Court's determination")); Pratt v. Wood, 620 N.Y.S.2d 551 (App.
Div. 1994).
120. Scott L. v. Bruce N., 509 N.Y.S.2d 971, 975 (Fam. Ct. 1986).
121. Id. at 973.
813
29
PACE LAW REVIEW
Because of this, the most misleading aspect of the Commis-
sion's work is its warning that "court [s] should not ask an attor-
ney for the child for a recommendation or personal opinion...
[because] the attorney for the child is not an arm of the court or
a fiduciary and ... he or she must advocate on that child's be-
half as is required of any other attorney in a civil proceeding or
action."1 22 Once again, the Commission seeks to obfuscate the
true nature of the child's lawyer's role. The authority relied
upon for prohibiting courts seeking the personal opinion of the
child's lawyer is Graham v. Graham,123 a 2005 decision from the
Third Department which, depending on how one reads its dic-
tum, can be construed to have changed the terms of the child's
attorney's proper role. Because Graham might be read as radi-
cally reshaping New York's understanding of the role of a
child's lawyer, it deserves careful attention.
Graham affirmed a trial court's order changing the custo-
dial arrangement involving a 10-year-old girl. The appellate
court was "unable to conclude that Family Court's determina-
tion lacks evidentiary support. The difficulty in making a
choice between the conflicting positions argued in this case is
reflected by the great reluctance with which the Law Guardian
advocated for a change in custody."124 Though it affirmed, the
Third Department criticized the conduct of both the Family
Court judge and the law guardian, observing that it was "im-
proper for Family Court to direct the child's attorney, the law
guardian, to file a 'report' in this case."125 After the trial, the
Law Guardian submitted what he called his "summation" in
writing which relied only on evidence in the record, and recom-
mended changing custody. The appellate court was disturbed,
however, that the trial court "not only referred to the 'summa-
tion' as a 'report"' but adopted "the Law Guardian's submission
in its entirety." 26
Graham would be easy to understand if that is all there
were to it. Thus far, it appears that all the appellate court was
122. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 43.
123. 806 N.Y.S.2d 755 (App. Div. 2005).
124. Id. at 757.
125. Id. (citing Weiglhofer v. Weiglhofer, 766 N.Y.S.2d 727, 729 (App. Div.
2003)).
126. Id.
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troubled by was that the trial court may have deferred to the
law guardian's views instead of, as is plainly the court's duty,
deciding the matter independently, giving only as much weight
to what the law guardian had to say as the court thought appro-
priate. But Graham confusingly seems to go further and also
criticized the child's lawyer for making "recommendations" in
his submission, worrying that perhaps the lawyer, along with
the trial court, "may have misunderstood his role." 127 The court
expressed the concern that:
The use by a court of the 'recommendation of the Law Guardian'
has too long been tolerated in Family Court and matrimonial pro-
ceedings. When a court asks the child's attorney to make 'a recom-
mendation,' it improperly elevates the Law Guardian's position to
something more important to the court than the positions of the
attorneys for each of the parents. Attorneys representing parents
do not advocate on behalf of their clients by making 'reports' and
'recommendations.' The Law Guardian should take a position on
behalf of the child at the completion of a proceeding whether
orally, on the record, or in writing and that position must be sup-
ported by evidence in the record. 128
Taken literally, this would be an astonishing repudiation of
an unwavering line of cases endorsing the role of law guardians
as making recommendations based on the evidence. This is
particularly so in light of precedents decided by the same court
which are not even cited. Thus, in a 1999 decision, the same
court wrote that "lo]ne of the functions of a Law Guardian is to
assist the court in determining an appropriate disposition. An
obvious incident of the Law Guardian's role as advocate for the
child is the right to advance the disposition perceived to be most
consonant with the well-being of the child."129
Though Graham literally prohibits law guardians from
making recommendations, the court modifies this injunction by
directing that law guardians "take a position on behalf of the
child at the completion of a proceeding." 30 Thus, Graham sim-
ply wishes to do away with the term "recommendation" when
127. Id. at 758.
128. Id. (citation omitted).
129. Forsyth v. White, 698 N.Y.S.2d 743, 745 (App. Div. 1999) (citing In re
Dewey S., 573 N.Y.S.2d 769, 770 (App. Div. 1991)).
130. Graham, 806 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
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characterizing the law guardian's advocacy, preferring "posi-
tion" instead. This is, of course, a distinction without a differ-
ence. After all was said and done, the appellate court in
Graham affirmed the trial court's order, emphasizing that the
outcome was based upon the appellate court's independent
search of the record, and expressly treating the law guardian's
recommendations "more properly as the position of the attorney
representing the child."131
It is unlikely that Graham's preference for the word "posi-
tion" over "recommendation" will ultimately prevail in the case
law. 132 Over the past 30 years, nearly 200 cases expressly refer-
131. Id. Graham's reasoning that law guardians should be prohibited from
making recommendations because "[aittorneys representing parents do not advo-
cate on behalf of their clients by making . . . 'recommendations,"' and also cannot
withstand analysis. Id. The reason attorneys representing parents may not do
this is because attorneys representing parents are obliged by the First Principle of
an attorney's duty toward an unimpaired client, which is to allow the client to set
the objectives of the case and direct the actions of his or her lawyer, at least to the
extent of what the lawyer is permitted to seek as the ultimate outcome. MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILIYY R. 1.2 (2006); N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBIL-
iTY, 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 12000.32(a)(1). We begin, in other words, with such dissimi-
larly situated arrangements when lawyers are representing children who are not
setting the objective of the outcome and when lawyers are representing adults who
are, that it simply will not do for courts to note that adult's lawyers could not do
what a child's lawyer just did. If what the child's lawyer did is unacceptable, it
must be for reasons independent of whether adults' lawyers could do the same
thing.
132. The principal case cited by Graham in support of its condemnation of law
guardians issuing reports is not remotely pertinent to what the law guardian in
Graham did. In Weiglhofer v. Weiglhofer, 766 N.Y.S.2d 727 (App. Div. 2003), the
trial court entered an order without conducting or hearing any evidence in the
case. In lieu of a hearing, the trial court ordered and relied on a "report" from the
law guardian. The Third Department condemned this practice, emphasizing that
the law guardian is "not an investigative arm of the court." Weiglhofer, 766
N.Y.S.2d at 729. But, instead of condemning the practice of law guardians making
recommendations as a general proposition, Weiglhofer endorsed the practice of
"law guardians, as advocates, [ ] mak[ing] their positions known to the court orally
or in writing (by way of, among other methods, briefs or summations)." Id.
Weiglhofer stands for the unremarkable rule that "presenting reports containing
facts which are not part of the record or making submissions directly to the court
ex parte are inappropriate practices." Id. (citing Rueckert v. Reilly, 723 N.Y.S.2d
232, 233 (App. Div. 2001)). In Rueckert v. Reilly, the court rejected a parent's con-
tention that the law guardian acted improperly by providing the court with un-
sworn reports. The Second Department agreed that the attorney for the child,
"could no more be required to report to a judge than the attorney for any party in a
case." Rueckert, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 233. But, the law guardian's choice to advocate
for the position of the child "in the presence of counsel for the parties ... did not
816
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol27/iss4/10
2007] LAW GUARDIAN BY ANY OTHER NAME
ence a "law guardian's recommendation" in the published opin-
ion issued by the court.133 Indeed, except for Graham, every
court that has commented on the subject has endorsed the role
of the law guardian as making recommendations to the court.
The oft cited Vecchiarelli v. Vecchiarelli,34 prominently cited by
the Commission, reversed a trial court order entered without
the use of a law guardian emphasizing that the child's lawyer
"would have been able to recommend alternatives for the court's
consideration and to advocate for the children in these
proceedings." 35
As we have already seen, one of the most important func-
tions courts expect children's attorneys to perform is to recom-
mend a course of action for the court. The classic definition of
the role of the child's lawyer, as expressed in a 1994 decision, is
that they are treated "as parties which have the right, or duty,
to express their own views on the case." 36 Additionally, the
court emphasized, this second role ("guardian") is so different
from the first ("defense attorney") that an entire different body
of law applies to it. 37 It is analogous to the role of a guardian
ad litem who is charged with the duty "to make an objective
evaluation of the circumstances and to take such action as will
advance what he perceives to be the best interest of the ward;
the wishes of the ward will be relevant but not
determinative." 38
As we have also seen, courts, including the Court of Ap-
peals, routinely reference the child's lawyer's recommendation
constitute a report." Id. (citing Carballeira v. Shumway, 710 N.Y.S.2d 149 (App.
Div. 2000)).
133. Westlaw search for New York cases using the phrase "'law guardian'/2
recommendation" turned up 198 cases as of August 15, 2006.
134. 656 N.Y.S.2d 337 (App. Div. 1997).
135. Id. at 338 (citing Koppenhoefer v. Koppenhoefer, 558 N.Y.S.2d 596,
599-600 (App. Div. 1990)).
136. Marquez v. Presbyterian Hospital, 608 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1016 (Sup. Ct.
1994).
137. Id. at 1015-16.
138. Id. (quoting In re Aho, 347 N.E.2d 647, 650-51 (N.Y. 1976)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). See also Bluntt v. O'Connor, 737 N.Y.S.2d 471, 479
(App. Div. 2002) (noting that law guardians are "appointed to use [their] skill and
judgment to aid the court in deciding what visitation was in the child's best
interests").
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as an additional justification for the result it reached. 139 All
four Appellate Divisions, including the Third, regularly do SO.14
Thus, the First Department, upholding an award of custody,
wrote, "[t]he record, which consists of the testimony of both par-
ents, the Law Guardian's recommendation and [a] report... is
adequate to support the court's determination of custody."'
The Second Department has noted "[f]urthermore, the custody
determination was consistent with the Law Guardian's recom-
mendation." 42 Indeed, the Second Department has even re-
versed a Family Court order because, among other things, the
Family Court improperly disregarded the recommendation of
the law guardian whom the appellate court described as an "im-
partial observer[ ].,,143 The Third Department recently wrote,
"[biased upon the totality of the circumstances set forth in this
record, including evidence relating to the stability provided by
respondent for the child, the fact that he has thrived under her
care and the Law Guardian's recommendation, we find that the
court properly determined that sole custody to respondent was
in the child's best interests."M And the Fourth Department
saw fit to rely on the law guardian's recommendation in 2005 to
justify its affirmance, stating, "[W]e further agree with the Law
139. See, e.g., In re Nathaniel T., 492 N.E.2d 775, 777 (N.Y. 1986) ("[Bloth
Law Guardians, court-appointed attorneys whose role was to protect and represent
the interests of the children, have filed recommendations and briefs urging" the
result reached by the Court); In re Ray A.M., 339 N.E.2d 135, 138 (N.Y. 1975) ("It
is significant too that the Law Guardian for the child ... has submitted a useful
and thoughtful brief and argument, urging" this outcome).
140. See, e.g., Grathwol v. Grathwol, 727 N.Y.S.2d 825, 829 (App. Div. 2001)
("We also note that the Law Guardian's recommendation, although not binding on
this Court, fully supports the determination made by Family Court that it will be
in the child's best interest to be with petitioner."); In re Anthony M., 705 N.Y.S.2d
715, 717 (App. Div. 2000) ("Notably, the Law Guardian appointed to represent the
child ... has advocated strongly in support" of what court holds"); Rolls v. Rolls,
663 N.Y.S.2d 345, 347 (App. Div. 1997) (citing Betancourt v. Boughton, 611
N.Y.S.2d 941, 944 n.4 (App. Div. 1994)) ("We also note that, although by no means
determinative, Supreme Court's determination that the children should remain
living with defendant was in accord with the Law Guardian's recommendation.");
Church v. Church, 656 N.Y.S.2d 416, 417 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting Moon v. Moon,
502 N.Y.S.2d 110, 112 (App. Div. 1986)) (noting that law guardians offer "relevant
and important insights").
141. Major v. Gamble-Major, 653 N.Y.S.2d 848 (App. Div. 1997).
142. Grossman v. Grossman, 772 N.Y.S.2d 559, 560 (App. Div. 2004).
143. Krebsbach v. Gallagher, 587 N.Y.S.2d 346, 350 (App. Div. 1992).
144. Scala v. Parker, 757 N.Y.S.2d 622, 625 (App. Div. 2003).
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Guardian's recommendation" with regards to placement and
visitation. 145
In light of all this, it quickly becomes evident that the Com-
mission did not intend that children's lawyers would suddenly
steer their efforts toward advocating for what children want
when that would mean other than advocating for what is in the
children's best interests. We can safely assume that there
would be no reason for the Commission to recommend any
changes in matrimonial practice unless there were features of
current practice it found wanting. Thus, had the Commission
called for courts to more commonly appoint children's lawyers
to advocate forcefully for the outcome desired by their clients, it
would have done so because it had concluded that courts were
giving insufficient weight to children's positions. 146 This might
be for either of two reasons. It might be that the Commission
was concerned that judges were inadequately made aware of
the child's position or that the Commission thought that judges
were giving insufficient weight to the child's position in too
many cases. These are very different problems.
Of these possibilities, we can comfortably reject that the
Commission meant to improve an imperfect process by which
courts were failing to ascertain the child's position. For one
thing, the instrument chosen to fix this perceived error is too
blunt. There are countless simpler and less expensive ways to
ensure that children reveal their position to a judge than to re-
quire counsel for children as the presumptive fix. 147 Beyond
this, it is even less likely that the Commission would insist that
the lawyer "diligently advocate" the child's position if the cure it
was striving for was merely to repair the procedural failing of
ensuring that the child's position be heard.
145. McAuley v. Martin, 807 N.Y.S.2d 255, 256 (App. Div. 2005).
146. If the Commission concluded that courts are currently deciding in accor-
dance with the children's desires in the vast number of contested cases, it simply
would not make sense for the Commission to prefer as a matter of course for courts
to appoint children's lawyers in order to achieve a result that would be reached in
any event. Moreover, anyone who is familiar with litigation appreciates the tru-
ism that a case is more likely to be resolved in accordance with a skilled lawyer's
effective advocacy than it would be without it.
147. Particularly given the broad problem in American society of denying so
many civil litigants court-assigned counsel even in cases of enormous importance
to them, it would be odd for the Commission to insist on lawyers for children in the
absence of a showing that they are likely to be needed in most instances.
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We can also comfortably reject the second possibility. It
should be readily apparent just how odd it would be if the Com-
mission actually meant to give more weight to children's prefer-
ences than current law does.148 A call for a greater use of
children's lawyers is tinkering with procedure. But if the hid-
den goal of these procedural changes were to impact substan-
tive law, the more direct route would have been to recommend
such changes in the law. It is plain that the Commission knew
how to make substantive recommendations when it believed
them appropriate. Its call for a change in the legal basis for
granting divorces, bringing New York into line with virtually
the rest of the country by permitting no-fault divorce, is an im-
portant example of such a recommendation. 149 So, too, the Com-
mission called upon the Office of Court Administration to seek
amendments to the law concerning the payment of children's
lawyers. 150 But it made no recommendation to modify section
70 of the Domestic Relations Law by making a child's expressed
wishes a more prominent factor in deciding cases than under
current law. Since neither of these reasons is plausible, it is
highly unlikely that the Commission would conclude there is a
pressing need for children's lawyers to advocate diligently what
children want.
V. The Commission Empowers Children's Lawyers
Not Children
Ultimately, it is plain that the Commission did not really
mean to limit the circumstances under which children's lawyers
are free to advocate the best interests of their clients because it
adopted the New York State Bar Association's Law Guardian
148. One could easily imagine children's advocates trying to empower chil-
dren more by insisting that courts rely more heavily on the child's wishes when
deciding custody disputes. One possible rule might call for courts to presume that
the child's wishes should be the determinative factor but allow courts to decide the
case in a contrary manner by articulating the specific reasons for doing so. In this
imagined world, courts would consider children's views significantly more promi-
nently than they do now. And in this world, one could easily understand the paral-
lel effort to ensure that attorneys represent children in these proceedings. But this
imagined world bears no relation to the laws of New York. New York is not a
jurisdiction that insists that children's wishes control the outcome of contested
custody disputes. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
149. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 18-19.
150. Id. at 44.
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Representation Standards as the authoritative guide for the
role of lawyers for children in custody cases.' 5' The State Bar
Standards require that the child's attorney "develop a position
and strategy ... concerning every relevant aspect of the pro-
ceedings." 52 The Commentary makes clear that developing
such a position and strategy constitutes the very heart of the
role ("the paramount law guardian responsibility," in its
words). 53 The Commentary stresses that "[w]hen the child is
too young to articulate his or her wishes or provide assistance to
counsel, the law guardian must of course determine the child's
interests independently." 54 Even when children are old enough
to articulate wishes, however, the Commentary does no more
than hope that "[iun most cases it is [I possible to articulate a
position with which both the law guardian and the child
agree." 55
Though the Commission may have obfuscated this issue, it
is inarguable that children's lawyers will continue to perform
their expected role of making recommendations to courts. The
Commission expects children's lawyers to choose for themselves
what to advocate while calling their advocacy "the child's posi-
tion." Sometimes the lawyer's choice corresponds with what the
child actually wants. But there need be no correlation whatso-
ever between them. Often the child is too young even to express
a view or to express it with sufficient gravity to be taken very
seriously by the lawyer.
The Commission authorizes a child's attorney to disregard
the client's wishes when he or she is "convinced . . . that the
child lacks the capacity for making a knowing, voluntary, and
considered judgment." 5 6 But this limitation only applies when
151. Id. at 42-43.
152. NEW YORK STATE BAR ASS'N, COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, LAW
GUARDIAN REPRESENTATION STANDARDS VOLUME II: CUSTODY CASES 6 (2005), avail-
able at http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentGroups/Children-and-theLaw/
2005NYSBAchildcustodystandardsMayl32005_finaldraft.pdf [hereinafter NYSBA
STANDARDS].
153. Id. at 22.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 24.
156. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 40 (quoting Appel-
late Division, Second, Third and Fourth Departments, Law Guardian Program Ad-
ministrative Handbook (2004), http://nycourts.gov/ad4/lg/lg-2004handbook.pdf
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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children are capable of expressing their wishes. Even if we as-
sume that most lawyers would comfortably allow their older cli-
ents to set the objectives in their case, the great majority of
cases involves children under the age of ten.157 Moreover, even
the limitation on when children's lawyers are permitted to ad-
vocate for a result opposite from what their clients want is writ-
ten in language which obfuscates the full measure of discretion
it accords. On the one hand, it suggests that unless the lawyer
is "convinced" of something, he or she should follow the child's
stated preferences. On the other hand, this is a modification of
a principle originally created by the Supreme Court designed to
have an effect opposite from how it is used here. Courts must
first conclude that an individual's decision has been made "com-
petently and intelligently," before they may permit someone to
waive constitutionally protected rights. 158 The Commission
uses this very high standard (adding "considered" for good mea-
sure) to make it easier to conclude that a child's preferences are
not binding on his or her lawyer. Even more, although chil-
dren's lawyers are supposed to be "convinced" before not being
bound by a child's preferences, they need only conclude that the
child lacks something an adult would possess to believe that the
child's views are not truly "knowing, voluntary and considered."
For many adults, whenever they sincerely believe that a child
wants something that is not good for them, they are convinced
that the child's views lack an important measure of what, for
these purposes, can be construed as "considered judgment."
Second, children's lawyers are also empowered to disregard
their client's stated preferences when the lawyer believes "that
following the child's wishes is likely to result in a risk of physi-
cal or emotional harm to the child."159 It is entirely up to the
157. Because courts tend to give more weight to the preferences of children
over fourteen, there are relatively few custody cases filed involving children four-
teen or older. As a consequence, virtually all highly contested cases involve chil-
dren who are between infandy and fourteen. Since there is little reason to assume
that children are distributed unevenly across the scope of contested custody cases,
we may comfortably assume that there are as many two-years-olds who are the
subject of custody cases as there are twelve-years-olds. By this reasoning, the
overwhelming percentage of children in contested custody cases are under the age
of fourteen and the great majority are under the age of ten.
158. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938).
159. MATRIMONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 40 (quoting Appel-
late Division, Second, Third and Fourth Departments, Law Guardian Program Ad-
822 [Vol. 27:785
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child's lawyer what position to choose and the child's lawyer
complies faithfully with the Commission's recommendations
even when he or she advocates for a result opposed by the child.
The child's lawyer has the ultimate power to make all of these
choices whether or not the children are very young.
This is not to say that children's lawyers seek results most
of the time to which their clients are opposed. There often is
symmetry between what the child's lawyer advocates and what
the client wants. But rare is the child's lawyer who simply
asks: "What does my client want?" Children's lawyers, like
courts, actually are using the child's views as a factor in the
arithmetic of determining what is in the child's best interests.
When children's lawyers conclude that what is best for their cli-
ent is what their client wants, no one ever detects any diver-
gence from the duty to advocate for what the client wants.
Since that is what the child's lawyer is doing, it matters not at
all to the practitioner how the lawyer reached that choice. But
it really does make a considerable difference.
Children's lawyers in practice seek to help the court reach
the best outcome for the child, not to reach the outcome the
child most wants. Although there are many cases in which
these two results overlap, it is important to appreciate that
when courts decide cases in accordance with what the children
want, it is not because of what the children want. Rather, it is
because the judge believes the result is best for the child.
It is true that these recommendations will be bounded by
certain important principles advanced by the Commission's Re-
port. In particular, the Commission's emphasis that "[t~he law
guardian is the attorney for the child"160 will help eradicate the
occasional practice of children's lawyers engaging in ex-parte
communications with courts. Instead, children's lawyers will be
expected to choose a position to advocate, and strategically seek
to influence the outcome of the case at pre-trial conferences,
during negotiations, when arguing motions, and when making
closing arguments. 161 The State Bar Standards approved by the
ministrative Handbook (2004), http://nycourts.gov/ad4/lg/lg-2004handbook.pdf
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
160. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 39..
161. NYSBA STANDARDS, supra note 152, Standard B-7 cmt., at 27. "The law
guardian, as an attorney, may also prepare and submit a post-trial memorandum
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Commission not only expect children's lawyers to deliver a sum-
mation, and prepare closing memoranda of law when appropri-
ate,162 they regard summation as "essential" because it is "the
best opportunity to articulate the [child's lawyer's] position."163
Ironically, what many consider to be the principal dangers
in using children's lawyers in these proceedings was extolled as
a virtue by the New York State Bar Association in 1999 when it
adopted the Law Guardian Representation Standards. The
State Bar stressed that, "[t]he law guardian is often perceived
as being 'neutral' in otherwise adversarial proceedings.... [and
this] appearance of neutrality often gives the law guardian
great influence." 64 It certainly does. Everyone familiar with
how law guardians are perceived by the litigants in contested
custody disputes appreciates just how powerful they are. Al-
though it is possible to win a case when the child's lawyer op-
poses the result a party seeks, all recognize the uphill fight the
party has in overcoming the advantage the opposing party has
gained from enjoying the law guardian's support.
Even more, the New York State Bar Association seeks to
maximize the children's lawyer's influence in the outcome by
celebrating his or her disproportionate power in the case:
Helpful to the law guardian is the fact that he or she is the only
neutral participant other than the judge, and the person who is
legally bound to represent the child's interests. A law guardian
proposal may accordingly be viewed by a party as less threatening
and less adversarial. The other attorneys know that in most cases
the court looks to the law guardian for suggestions for a resolu-
tion. Great weight may therefore be given to the law guardian's
summarizing and discussing the evidence in the record, making legal arguments,
and advocating a disposition. A post-trial memorandum, unlike a pre-trial report,
is based on testimony and other evidence found in the record." Id. (citation
omitted).
162. Id. Standard C-4, at 28.
163. Id. Standard C-4 cmt., at 29. Moreover, the Standards direct law guardi-
ans to use the summation and any post-trial memoranda they might submit to
outline "the law guardian's conclusions and recommendations." Id. (emphasis ad-
ded). Even more, law guardians are to be actively involved not only in custody and
visitation inquiries, but in the financial features of the case. Id. Standard B-2
cmt., at 22.
164. NEW YORK STATE BAR ASS'N, COMM1I7EE ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, LAW
GUARDIAN REPRESENTATION STANDARDS VOLUME II: CUSTODY CASES 6 (1999), http:/
/www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/AttorneyResources/NYSBAReports/
Guide-toRepresentingChildrer/Guide-toRepresentingChildren.htm.
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position, a fact which is often helpful in negotiating a pre-trial
resolution. 165
All of this makes the Commission's Report troubling. Its
stress that children's lawyers are "lawyers" above all else masks
the central truth that the role the Commission expects chil-
dren's lawyer's to play is virtually unrecognizable in the ordi-
nary attorney-client relationship. Its suggestion that
authorizing best interests lawyers to advocate for the position
they have chosen is akin to what "is required of any other attor-
ney in a civil proceeding or action,"1 66 could not be more mis-
leading. After taking away the essential meaning of an
attorney's duty to help clients live the lives they choose, it is
nonsense to suggest that everything else remains the same.
The contrast with what ordinary lawyers must do and what
the Commission authorizes children's lawyers to do could not be
more in tension. Children's lawyers enjoy a measure of inde-
pendence and freedom unparalleled in the law except when law-
yers are representing incompetents. This is why we generally
prefer to acknowledge the different roles by emphasizing the
one as a guardian-ward relationship and the other as an attor-
ney-client relationship. It is just as deceiving to call a guardian
just another lawyer as it is to call a ward just another client. As
Jane Spinak recently wrote about a related phenomenon,
"[slomehow the drafters believe that by giving a new name to
someone who looks an awful lot like a GAL or hybrid advocate
but who has to be a practicing lawyer and use the best practices
of a child's lawyer, they will resolve the ambiguities of those
traditional roles "167
What's really interesting about all of this is just how much
children know the difference between having a real lawyer and
the kind of lawyer New York courts give them instead. As a
result of a celebrated case I handled in the early 1990s, one of
my specialities has included representing children in custody
cases who dislike their court-appointed law guardian. In 1992,
a 12-year-old boy contacted me to complain about his court-ap-
165. Id. at Standard B-3 cmt.
166. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 43.
167. Jane M. Spinak, Simon Says Take Three Steps Backwards: The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Recommendations on Child
Representation, 6 NEV. L.J. 1385, 1389 (2006).
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pointed law guardian. The child told me that, although he
thought his lawyer would be someone fighting for what he
wanted, he came to regard his lawyer as his enemy because the
law guardian consistently sought things the child did not want.
The child asked me to represent him. I filed a motion to be sub-
stituted as counsel for the court-appointed law guardian. The
presiding judge, Judge William Rigler, made a Solomonic deci-
sion, replacing the law guardian but appointing a new law
guardian instead of me in order to avoid any appearance of bias
on my part after one of the parents expressed a concern that I
had been influenced by the other parent. 168 The case received a
fair amount of publicity, being reported in The New York Times
as a case in which a child was able to fire his lawyer.169
Ever since, children have contacted me periodically com-
plaining about their law guardian. Their complaints are strik-
ingly similar. They all told me that they wanted a lawyer who
would fight for them. After I explained to them that the law
guardian is not obliged to seek the outcome the child wants, the
children made clear that, if they could not have a lawyer who
would seek what they want, they would much prefer not having
a lawyer at all. My meetings with these children have per-
suaded me that they appreciate what many lawyers in the field
do not: that the core meaning of a lawyer in American culture is
dramatically at odds with the role and purpose of a law guard-
ian. Children, at least those I have met, dislike hypocrisy most
of all. They can comfortably accept not being permitted an at-
torney. But they deeply resent being assigned someone who
calls herself an attorney and then behaves inconsistently with
the core meaning of what attorneys are.
It is important to agree that when someone chooses to seek
an outcome that I have specifically repudiated and made clear I
do not wish, it is not a misuse of language to regard that person
as my enemy. And that is the very context in which a number
of children have conticted me over my career. These children
168. See P. v. P., 208 N.Y. L.J. 29 (Nov. 10, 1992).
169. Arnold H. Lubasch, Boy in Divorce Suit Wins Right to Choose His Law-
yer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1992, at B6; Arnold H. Lubasch, 11-Year-Old in Custody
Battle Wants to Trade in His Lawyer, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 1992, at B3.
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always felt they suffered the worst of both worlds. 170 They could
far more easily have tolerated not being represented than they
could suffer the indignity of being formally represented by their
enemy. For the most part, courts have been tone deaf to this
problem.
After my success in 1992, I tried, on several other occa-
sions, to have a court remove the assigned law guardian on the
same basis as the first case: that the children had lost all confi-
dence in their law guardians because they refused to try to ob-
tain the results desired by the children. None of the other
attempts were successful. Two examples of my failures are in-
structive because they reveal, yet again, the degree to which
judges regard law guardians as court aides, not as children's
lawyers.
In the winter of 1995, I was contacted by the aunt of two
children who were the subject of a particularly ugly divorce and
custody dispute. The aunt asked me to meet with her nephews,
aged eleven and nine, to hear their complaint. I did so. The
boys reported to me that Justice Lewis Friedman of Manhattan
Supreme Court assigned a law guardian to them and they were
desperate to fire the law guardian whom they came to regard as
an enemy. They explained to me that the law guardian consist-
ently took positions antithetical to what they wanted and that
they would not agree to continue even to answer the law guard-
ian's inquiries because whatever they told him he used as he
saw fit. I brought a motion by Order to Show Cause seeking to
relieve the court-appointed law guardian and to appoint some-
one else or to permit the boys to retain Mr. Wiener and me to
represent them.171 The transcript of the argument on our mo-
tion is highly instructive.
According to the transcript, I told Judge Friedman that "I
know of no case in which, after a child-client has told the Court
that he does not trust his lawyer sufficiently to confide in him,
that the Court has permitted the relationship to continue.
170. Cf. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) ("[Tlhere may be
grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets
neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative
treatment postulated for children.").
171. Eliott Wiener, a highly respected member of the matrimonial bar, was
co-counsel with me.
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Wholly apart from the question of the role of counsel for [the
child] is the question of ... the current relationship being con-
taminated beyond repair."1 72 Justice Friedman replied: "Every
time you use the word, counsel, I note you are not using the
term 'law guardian' which is consistent with everybody's prob-
lem with the legislative division of the role." When I responded
that I was talking about the law guardian-client relationship,
Judge Friedman announced: "The only client the law guardian
had, I thought, was me." He went on to clarify that:
The relationship with the client or clients may be equivalent, but
the terms of who the overall client of the law guardian is, I
thought that was the Court. I thought that's pretty clear. The
law guardian serves at the Court's pleasure and not at the plea-
sure of the clients. I think that much is fairly clear also. 173
An almost identical motion in the Supreme Court Erie
County around the same time brought an almost identical reac-
tion from the court. In the Buffalo case, the children who asked
me to have the judge replace the court-appointed law guardian
hated the fact that they were obliged to be represented in name
by someone who was devoted to achieving a result the children
opposed. I tried with all my eloquence to persuade the Special
Term Judge to relieve the law guardian. When I complained
that the children were dissatisfied with the court-appointed law
guardian, the judge politely but firmly told me that was of no
consequence to her. She wanted a law guardian to help her de-
cide the case. She was very pleased with the law guardian's
performance. The children's feelings on the subject simply were
irrelevant.
Conclusion
The Commission may have been uncomfortable acknowl-
edging the degree to which children's lawyers not only are per-
mitted, but expected, to advocate for what they perceive to be
their client's best interests. Regardless of the emphasis the
Commission chose to place on the purpose and role of children's
172. Transcript of Court Proceeding at 1357, Anonymous v. Anonymous, In-
dex No. 312208/94 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. January 29, 1996) (on file with the
author).
173. Id. at 1358.
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lawyers, the truth is that these lawyers will not, and are not
expected to, diligently advocate for the result desired by their
clients simply because that is what their clients want.
By pretending that children's lawyers do not possess ex-
traordinary powers commonly denied ordinary lawyers, the
Commission failed to say enough about how children's lawyers
should constrain their authority to decide for themselves what
objectives to fight for. Other than warning them against acting
on their own biases,'174 the Commission simply leaves children's
lawyers free to make all of the important decisions with which
they are charged. They are free to decide whether or when to be
bound by what their client instructs. And they are equally free
to advocate for whatever position they choose after deciding not
to be bound by what their client instructs. 175
It is inadequate for the Commission only to recommend
that training of children's lawyers be expanded to include "ad-
dressing one's own biases."1 76 Though the Commission warned
children's lawyers to "avoid actions or positions based on pre-
conceived notions about sexual, racial or class roles or stereo-
types, and seek to protect the child's interests without trying to
impose the attorney's own value system or sociological theories
on the child or family," 77 this is considerably easier said than
done. We each possess pre-conceived notions about the good life
which we are incapable of recognizing, let alone ignoring, when
assessing such inherently subjective inquiries as what will best
serve a child. The problem is not with alerting lawyers to be
concerned about this and to encourage them to be introspective;
the problem is being satisfied that warning lawyers is
sufficient.
The surest solution to constraining the misuse of discretion
to choose for a child does not lie in additional training, it lies in
restricting the power to exercise the discretion in the first
174. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 43.
175. Few adults find it easy to resist the conclusion that when a child seeks a
result the adult regards as inimical to the child's best interests, the child is not
making a considered judgment. This becomes an even easier conclusion to reach
when children's lawyers are expressly told not to advance their client's wishes if
they are "likely to result in a risk of physical or emotional harm to the child." Id.
at 40.
176. Id. at 43.
177. NYSBA STANDARDS, supra note 152, at 3.
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place.' 78 And here, most of all, the Commission published an
incomplete Report by failing to discuss the alternative strate-
gies employed in several national efforts to reduce the circum-
stances in which lawyers' personal beliefs would ever even have
the chance to determine their advocacy. Perhaps the Commis-
sion, like the Third Department in Graham v. Graham, 79 be-
lieves that children's lawyers are meaningfully constrained in
their options because the "position" they choose "must be sup-
ported by evidence in the record."180 But this modest restriction
quickly proves to be no restriction at all. Any time a lawyer
argues for a result that is unsupported by the record, the law-
yer's argument is in trouble. Insisting only that the lawyer ar-
gue for things that arguably are supported by something
someone in the case already said actually permits lawyers the
equivalent of carte blanche authority to argue for anything the
lawyer thinks is appropriate.
This article has demonstrated that lawyers for children in
custody cases in New York are expected to inform courts of
what their clients say they want the court to do, but are rela-
tively free to advocate for the result the lawyers believe will
best serve their clients. That has been the role of children's
lawyers since they were first called upon to participate in cus-
tody cases and it remains the role after the Commission com-
pleted its work. For those who doubt the wisdom of lawyers
performing this role, we hoped the Commission would provide
either a repudiation of the use of children's lawyers for this pur-
pose or a sustained defense of the practice. By doing neither,
the Commission missed an important opportunity to make a
lasting contribution to this important area of practice.
178. See Martin Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need for Counsel for Chil-
dren in Custody, Visitation and Child Protection Proceedings, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
299, 310-13 (1998).
179. 806 N.Y.S.2d 755 (App. Div. 2005).
180. Id. at 758.
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